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The struggle for the restoration of a multi party 
democracy in Africa began in the early 1990s and 
gained prominence with the first of such elec-
tions that were held between 1990 and 1995. But 
while twenty years should be sufficient time for the 
promises of democracy to begin to show, the slow 
pace of democratic consolidation in Africa has led 
to a debate about the nexus between elections and 
democratic consolidation  in the continent: Over the 
last decade, the majority of elections that were held 
in Africa failed the legitimacy and credibility test 
(examples are Nigeria 2003 and 2009, Kenya 2007, 
Zimbabwe 2008, Cote d´Ivoire 2010). On the other 
hand within the same time a number of countries 
held elections that were seen to be largely credible 
(examples are Ghana 2008, Zambia 2011, Senegal 
2012). From the standpoint of democratization, these 
elections brought out one telling fact: periodic elec-
tions are not by themselves a guarantee for sustain-
able democracy.
Post election violence in 2007/8…
Kenya held its fifth multi party elections on 4th 
March 2013. The 2013 elections came in the wake 
of the disputed 2007 elections and the post-election 
violence. Following the declaration of the results, the 
country faced violence and destruction of property 
that was previously unseen in its electoral his-
tory. The violence that began in January persisted 
until February 2008. The violence also led to over 
600,000 internally displaced persons. In response 
to escalating violence, the international community 
appointed a panel of Eminent African Personalities 
led by Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of 
the United Nations, to spearhead mediation work 
between the disputing parties. The mediation efforts 
led to the establishment of the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act that ushered in the Grand Coali-
tion Government
… and its major implications
The overriding goal of the Grand Coalition govern-
ment was to restore peace and stability while at the 
same time implementing comprehensive reforms. 
Between 2008 and 2012 Kenya embarked on a 
journey to institute reforms: The hallmark of these 
reforms initiatives was the passage of a new constitu-
tion in 2010. Within the electoral sphere, the new 
constitution created a radically new framework for 
holding elections, including new legislations as well 
as new institutions to manage and supervise the 
elections. Undoubtedly, these reforms raised a lot of 
expectations and confidence on Kenyans with regard 
to the electoral process. 
Conversely, the introductions imposed by the new 
constitution also had the unintended effect of com-
plicating the electoral process. The presidential run 
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off now contemplated a higher threshold; a winning 
candidate had to attain the majority of all the votes 
cast (50+1) which was hitherto unknown in the coun-
try’s electoral history. Within the context of Kenyan 
tribal politics, this provision, while noble, had the 
potential of entrenching ethnicity in the elections 
through tribal alliances and coalitions.  
The new constitution also increased the number of 
elective offices from three to at least six. The cost 
implications of holding elections in six elective offices 
simultaneously were enormous. Holding six elections 
also caused logistical nightmares both to the IEBC 
and political parties.
The 2013 election was also a transitional election. 
President Mwai Kibaki, who had served his two-five 
years term, was ineligible for re-election. Thus, as 
with all transitional elections, the stake of winning or 
losing was great and manifested itself in the nature 
and tone of the political campaigns. 
Finally, the 2013 election was held against the back-
drop of the international criminal trials at the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. Two of 
the leading contenders, namely Uhuru Kenyatta and 
William Ruto, had been indicted as perpetrators of 
the 2008 post-election violence.    Thus, the question 
of the ICC was politicized by both sides of the politi-
cal divide and communities were mobilized for or 
against the ICC trials.
Elections 2013: Process and results 
The political and electoral environment preceding 
the 2013 elections was generally calm and peace-
ful albeit with some tensions. However, on Election 
Day, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission (IEBC) experienced serious logistical 
challenges with the Electronic verification machines 
and the transmission system that had been intro-
duced as a means of enhancing transparency in the 
electoral process. 
In the run up to the elections, four main coalitions 
emerged which subsequently contested the elec-
tions. The coalitions were; the Jubilee Coalition that 
was headed by Uhuru Kenyatta and Wiliam Ruto; 
the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) 
headed by Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka; 
AMANI Coalition whose Presidential candidate was  
Musalia Mudavadi and finally the EAGLE coali-
tion that was headed by  Peter Kenneth. Consistent 
with the prediction of the various opinion polls over 
the years, the presidential contest took a two horse 
race pitting Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga as 
the front runners. On 10th March 2013, the IEBC 
declared Kenyatta as having been duly elected the 
4th President of Kenya. Following the declaration 
of results, the CORD coalition signaled its desire to 
challenge the electoral results alleging breaches to 
the electoral laws, manipulation of results and com-
plicity by the IEBC personnel to the Jubilee’s victory. 
The election petition was filed in the Supreme Court 
but the Supreme Court ruled against the petition and 
affirmed Uhuru Kenyatta as the duly elected presi-
dent of Kenya.
Lessons learnt
The elections from 2007 and 2013 provided useful 
lessons especially for transitional democracy coun-
tries in their quest for democratic consolidation. I 
will present the most important here:
Regrettably, the struggle for the restoration of multi 
party democracy in Africa was not accompanied by 
reforms that were suited for such a political dis-
pensation: Moreover, most countries repealed the 
constitutional provisions that had outlawed multi 
party politics while leaving intact all the other laws 
that had entrenched single party dictatorship. Thus, 
an uneven playing field evolved. To democratize 
the electoral arena the new election laws in Kenya 
provided an opportunity for all contesting parties 
to canvass for votes while at the same time boosting 
public confidence in the process. 
Weaknesses in the electoral process 2007 were 
enumerated by various commissions. According to 
the Kriegler Commission report, the manner in which 
the Kenyan constituencies were created undermined 
the principle of equality of the votes – as certain 
regions had a disproportionate share of constituen-
cies. Equally, the voter register that was used in 
2007 elections contained dead voters. Given these 
shortcomings, along with the setup of a new electoral 
framework the whole electoral circle was completely 
overhauled. Accordingly, a new process of the delimi-
tation of constituencies, voter registration, estab-
lishment of a new electoral body, registration and 
nominations by political parties, electoral campaign 
and Election Day activities were restructured.
Institutional failures were at the core of the letdowns 
in 2007 elections. One of the institutions singled out 
by the Kriegler Commission was the Electoral Com-
mission of Kenya (ECK). Thus, Kenya disbanded the 
old commission, and appointed a completely new 
one to prepare for the 2013 elections. The manner of 
appointment of the new commission was vested on 
parliament after vetting by an independent panel, 
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whereas in the past the president unilaterally ap-
pointed the commission – a practice that is still hap-
pening in most countries. Election management is 
critical to the overall success of elections but manipu-
lations and a lack of independence have been major 
challenges facing electoral commissions in Africa. To 
insulate the new commission in Kenya from future 
abuse, the establishment was anchored in the consti-
tution and a legal act that provided (among others) 
the mode of appointments, financial autonomy, 
security of tenure and the separation of the function 
of the commission and the secretariat. 
The 2013 elections in Kenya also reaffirmed the need 
for strengthening initiatives geared towards election 
observation. Despite all the reforms put in place be-
fore the elections, serious weaknesses were noted in 
the process and the overall management of elections. 
All the major election observer missions that were 
deployed conducted themselves in a professional 
manner and highlighted the failures that were noted 
in the process. While there is reluctance by most 
countries to accept election observers, the Kenyan 
experience underscored their importance as a mean 
of enhancing confidence and transparency. 
Judicial reforms and the restoration of the citizens 
in the judicial processes is also a major lesson that 
can be learnt from the Kenyan experience. The social 
construction of the African states from independ-
ence saw the centralization of power in the executive 
and the weakening of other state organs especially 
the judiciary. Almost all elections held in Africa over 
the last decade have ended in courts. In most cases, 
serious doubts were cast on the judiciary to be able 
to competently arbitrate over the election disputes. 
In Kenya 2007 the aggrieved parties failed to seek 
recourse in the judiciary – citing a lack of independ-
ence opting for mediation efforts. Due to the reforms 
in the Kenyan judicial sector, the aggrieved parties 
now challenged the presidential election in court 
and accepted the Supreme Court´s verdict (despite 
disagreeing with it).
As part of the lessons learnt from the 2008 post-elec-
tion violence, Kenya invested heavily on peace build-
ing and conflict prevention programmes through 
Civil Society Organisations and government agen-
cies. At the national and grassroots level mediation 
panels and peace committees were established which 
employed alternative dispute resolutions strategies. 
Judicial mechanisms for resolving conflict was also 
employed with the establishment of the National 
Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) and 
the empowerment of the police and the judiciary to 
prosecute perpetrators of violence. The media also 
developed a code of conduct that bounds themselves 
to promote peace. The multi-pronged approach that 
involved the state and the non-state actors ensured 
that peace prevailed in the 2013 elections.
Résumé and recommendations
Despite the progress made, Kenyan elections 2013 
still witnessed a lot of challenges. Redressing them 
will be crucial in consolidating democracy and good 
governance in future elections.  For example all voter 
identification devices and the results transmission 
systems, failed on Election Day. Given the fact that 
most countries in Africa are embracing such tech-
nologies in elections, the Kenyan experience calls for 
caution. The conduct of political parties throughout 
the campaigns was also noted as a weakness. And 
indeed party primaries were bedeviled by poor or-
ganisation and logistical failures that undermined the 
process. A lack of internal democracy also character-
ized the nominations, rendering the entire process 
shambolic. Given the significance of political par-
ties in a democracy, they should be strengthened to 
become strong and viable institutions – capable of 
representing the interests of the citizens. Finally, the 
resolution of the presidential petition by the Supreme 
Court was also cited as a challenge. While resorting 
to the judiciary to resolve the dispute was itself com-
mendable, reliance on technicalities by the Supreme 
Court to dismiss the case without attending to the 
substantive issues raised, may set a bad precedent 
in future resolution of such disputes, which may in 
turn discourage people from going to courts. The 
alternative to the courts as was seen in Kenya 2008, 
Zimbabwe 2008, and Ivory Coast in 2010 is electoral 
violence that has negative impact on elections and 
democracy.
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